

Message Text

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QUOTE

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TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSONS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 12, 1975
(SALT TWO-514)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
JOHNSON AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF FEBRUARY 12, 1975.

QUOTE: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
FEBRUARY 12, 1975

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MR. MINISTER:

I

TODAY I WILL CONTINUE TO SET FORTH SOME OF OUR VIEWS REGARDING THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO PREPARE. AT OUR LAST MEETING, I DISCUSSED SOME ASPECTS OF THIS AGREEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE LIMITATION OF AN AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NO MORE THAN 2400 DELIVERY VEHICLES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IN THIS CONNECTION I PRESENTED THE US VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THE SYSTEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE 2400 AGGREGATE LIMITATION, AND SOME OF THE DEFINITIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE AGREEMENT. TODAY I WILL SPEAK TO A DIFFERENT ASPECT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, NAMELY THE LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES (MIRVs), AND WHAT WE BELIEVE ARE SOME IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THAT MIRV LIMITATION.

II

A MAJOR FEATURE OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK IS THAT A NEW QUALITATIVE LIMITATION WILL BE APPLIED TO THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES, NAMELY, A LIMITATION ON ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVs. BASED ON THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING EACH SIDE WILL BE LIMITED TO NO MORE THAN 1320 LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVs. WITHIN THIS NUMBER EACH SIDE WILL BE ENTITLED TO DETERMINE THE TYPES AND NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVs, SUBJECT TO OTHER LIMITATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.

IN THIS CONNECTION A PRECISE DEFINITION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVs SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. THIS WILL ASSIST THE SIDES IN ARRIVING AT A CLEAR AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF WHICH TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS ARE SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION.

III

IN MY STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 4 I NOTED THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT, WITH ITS BROADER SCOPE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, SHOULD BE FORMULATED SO AS TO ASSURE THAT COMPLIANCE CAN BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. I WENT ON TO OBSERVE THAT VERIFYING THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH

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MIRVs IS A MORE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX TASK THAN VERIFYING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

IN THE COURSE OF OUR EXAMINATION OF THE MIRV LIMITATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT LIMITATION ON THE VERIFIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT, WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE NEED FOR THE SIDES TO BE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TYPES OF MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVs AND THOSE NOT SO EQUIPPED. SIMILARLY, TYPES OF LAUNCHERS ASSOCIATED

WITH MIRVED MISSILES WILL NEED TO BE DISTINGUISHED. FURTHER, THE SIDES WILL NEED TO BE ABLE TO ASSURE THEMSELVES THAT LAUNCHERS NOT COUNTED UNDER THE MIRV LIMITATIONS DO NOT IN FACT CONTAIN MIRVED MISSILES.

WE HAVE IDENTIFIED CERTAIN QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE ABILITY OF THE TWO SIDES TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THEIR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. OUR STUDY OF THESE QUESTIONS HAS LED US TO SOME VIEWS CONCERNING POSSIBLE SOLUTION. WE REALIZE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE MAY ARRIVE AT DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS FOR THESE QUESTIONS. WE ALSO REALIZE THAT YOU MAY IDENTIFY DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY WE BELIEVE THERE IS A NEED FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH VERIFYING THE MIRV LIMITATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IV

ONE QUESTION WE HAVE IS THIS: ONCE A CERTAIN TYPE OF MISSILE HAS BEEN FLIGHT TESTED WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE AND ALSO WITH MIRVS, IS IT POSSIBLE TO VERIFY WHICH VERSION OF THAT PARTICULAR TYPE OF MISSILE IS DEPLOYED? FOR EXAMPLE, WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN TESTING A NEW HEAVY ICBM (WHICH WE CALL THE SS-18) WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE AND ALSO WITH MIRVS. IT IS THE US VIEW THAT ANY MISSILE OF A TYPE WHICH HAS BEEN TESTED WITH MIRVS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WHEN DEPLOYED.

A SECOND QUESTION IS: WHEN BOTH MIRVED AND NON- MIRVED SLBMS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH CERTAIN SLBM LAUNCHERS, IS IT POSSIBLE TO VERIFY WHICH OF THOSE LAUNCHERS CONTAIN MIRVED MISSILES? WITH RESPECT TO THIS QUESTION, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT ALL SLBM LAUNCHERS ON ALL SUBMARINES OF A GIVEN CLASS SHOULD BE COUNTED AS MIRVED IF ANY SLBM LAUNCHER ON A SUBMARINE OF THE SAME CLASS IS MIRVED.

ANOTHER QUESTION IS: WHEN AN ICBM OR SLBM LAUNCHER WHICH HAS NOT CONTAINED A MIRVED MISSILE IS MODIFIED, FOR EXAMPLE,

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THROUGH CHANGES IN ITS LENGTH OR DIAMETER, IS IT POSSIBLE TO VERIFY THAT AFTER THE MODIFICATION, IT DOES NOT CONTAIN A MIRVED MISSILE? AS AN EXAMPLE, WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS MODIFIED SOME OF ITS LAUNCHERS FOR THE ICBM WHICH WE CALL THE SS-11 TO CONFIGURATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS TWO NEW ICBMS WHICH WE CALL THE SS-17 AND SS-19. SOME OF THE LAUNCHERS FOR THE HEAVY ICBM WHICH WE CALL THE SS-9 HAVE BEEN MODIFIED TO A CONFIGURATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW HEAVY ICBM, THE SS-18. ALL THREE OF THESE NEW TYPES OF SOVIET MISSILES HAVE BEEN TESTED WITH MIRVS. IN OUR VIEW, ALL ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS MODIFIED SO AS TO PERMIT THE DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVED MISSILES SHOULD BE COUNTED UNDER THE MIRV LIMITATION. WITH REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES JUST MENTIONED, WE CONSIDER THAT ALL LAUNCHERS OF SS-17, SS-18, OR SS-19 TYPES MUST BE COUNTED AS CONTAINING MIRVED MISSILES.

A FURTHER QUESTION IS: ONCE A LAUNCHER HAS CONTAINED A MIRVED MISSILE AND THEN HAS BEEN CONVERTED TO A LAUNCHER FOR A MISSILE NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, IS IT POSSIBLE TO VERIFY THAT THE LAUNCHER NO LONGER CONTAINS A MIRVED MISSILE? IF A SIDE CHANGES THE COMPOSITION OF ITS MIRVED FORCES, AS MAY OCCUR IN VIEW OF EACH SIDES, FREEDOM TO DETERMINE THE TYPES AND NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS FOR MIRVED MISSILES WITHIN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER, A LAUNCHER WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY CONTAINED A MIRVED MISSILE COULD BE CONVERTED TO A LAUNCHER FOR A MISSILE NOT EQUIPPED MIRVS. IN OUR VIEW, THE CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS WHICH CONTAIN MIRVED MISSILES TO LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES NOT SO EQUIPPED SHOULD BE PERMITTED ONLY UNDER PROCEDURES AGREED IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

V

I HAVE TODAY, AS I DID ON AN EARLIER OCCASION, GIVEN SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO THE SUBJECT OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE LIMITATION ON LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED MIRVS, A SUBJECT TO WHICH THE US SIDE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE. I EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS THE US VIEW THAT THE SIDES MUST UNDERTAKE NOT TO INTERFERE WITH OR IMPEDE THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER SIDE, INCLUDING THE MEANS OF VERIFYING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE MIRV PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

VI

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MR. MINISTER, TODAY I HAVE IDENTIFIED SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND PROPOSED SOME SOLUTIONS. LET ME REPEAT THAT THE US WELCOMES SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTIONS TO THESE QUESTIONS. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT SUCH PROPOSALS WILL RECEIVE CAREFUL US CONSIDERATION. ACCORDINGLY, I AGAIN SUGGEST THAT OUR TWO DELEGATIONS GIVE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE QUESTIONS THAT I HAVE RAISED, PERHAPS UTILIZING A WORKING GROUP TO FACILITATE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. UNQUOTE. JOHNSON

UNQUOTE: INGERSOLL

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